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in which the older members of the Commonwealth had voluntarily joined with us in resisting aggression. It was admittedly arguable that in order to fulfil such obligations on our part it was not essential that we should have
forces stationed in Australia, any more than Australia and New Zealand had
forces stationed in this country in 1914 or 1939. On the other hand, it
was essential to bear in mind the difference in the respective circumstances
of Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and of this country on the
other, and the intense importance attached by the former to our demonstrating
our intention to help them in resisting aggression by stationing forces in Australia. It was the presence rather than the size of the forces which was of decisive importance from this point of view. In any event, final decisions could not be taken until after discussions had taken place not only
with the United States, Australia and New Zealand, but also with Malaysia and
Singapore in respect both of the broader politico-military implications and
also of the local economic implications of the reduction of our forces.
Their reactions would be of critical importance to our eventual decision.
It would still be open to the Cabinet in the light of those consultations to
decide on total withdrawal from the Far East, including a decision to station
no forces in Australia, if this were felt to be appropriate in the light of
these preliminary consultations. In considering the implications it would
be necessary to bear in mind that the repercussions of the reductions which
were proposed in our forces and facilities in Singapore would have sub-
stantially greater economic effect there than the reductions which had
currently been accepted in Malta. Furthermore, the rate of United Kingdom
aid per head of population in Malta was about £18, compared with an average United Kingdom aid per head in Singapore of about 5/8d. The severity of the
economic consequences would call for further economic aid on a large scale if
disastrous social and political consequences were to be avoided and it would
be impossible to provide additional aid at the necessary level within the
present total allocation for our aid as a whole.
In further discussion there was general agreement that while it would be necessary to adopt, for the purpose of planning the structure and equip- ment of our armed forces, a date for our total withdrawal from Singapore and
Malaysia, there would be some objection to announcing this date, in that it
night commit us to stay in those countries longer than it might prove necessary to do in the event. The end of the conflict in Vietnam, a
date for which could not yet be foreseen, might well result in such a
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